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Todd: Torts

TORTS
I.

MOTOR VEHICLE TORT CLAIMS

ACT

In two closely decided opinions, the South Carolina Supreme
Court dealt with the scope of the South Carolina Governmental
Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act' and the right to a cause of action
provided therein. Both Truesdale v. South Carolina Highway
Dep't2 and Morris v. South CarolinaState Highway Dep't3 were
cases of first impression and both turned on the correct legal
definition of terms used within the Act.
Truesdale was a wrongful death action brought by the parents of a 9-year-old girl who was struck and killed by a motorist
while pursuing a puppy into the highway in front of an improperly
parked truck owned by the defendant-appellant. The plaintiffrespondents, as administrators of the deceased child's estate,
brought an action against the motorist and the appellant seeking
damages in the total amount of $35,000. Prior to the trial the
Truesdales executed a covenant not to sue the motorist for a
consideration of $6,000. Over the Department's objection, the
respondents were allowed to amend their complaint eliminating
the motorist as a party, thereby seeking judgment against the
Department alone. The jury found for the plaintiffs in the sum
of $35,000, which the trial judge reduced to the statutory maximum of $10,000.1
The Truesdales sought recovery against the Department
based on the negligence of an employee of the Department in
parking his pickup truck partially on the highway, thereby obstructing the view of oncoming cars as well as that of the highway.
A number of children were playing in the area. In addition to the
pickup truck, there were several other Department vehicles
parked in the area, but off the highway, which completely obscured the motorist's and child's view of each other until just
before the impact. There was no flagman or sign of any kind
warning of the obstruction.5
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2621 to -2625 (Cum. Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as the
Tort Claims Act].
2. 264 S.C. 221, 213 S.E.2d 740 (1975).
3. 264 S.C. 369, 215 S.E.2d 430 (1975).
4. See note 6 infra.
5. 264 S.C. 221, 225-26, 213 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1975).
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The Department maintained that the pickup truck was not
in "operation" within the meaning of section 10-26231 and, therefore, that the death of the infant was not caused by the "negligent
operation" of the Department's vehicle. Because the statute was
in derogation of the general common law principal of sovereign
immunity,7 the Department contended that it should be strictly
construed.' Such a strict construction, it was argued, would limit
recovery under the statute to only those situations where the
mechanism of the motor vehicle was engaged and the vehicle was
actually in motion.

While agreeing with the premise that the Tort Claims Act
must be strictly construed, Justice Bussey, writing for the threeman majority, disagreed with the conclusion that a parked vehicle was not in operation within the meaning of the statute. Quoting Lord Coke's well-known pronouncement on interpreting statutes,' the majority concluded that the legislative intent of the
6.

ANN. § 10-2623 (Cum. Supp. 1975) in pertinent part reads as follows:
Any person sustaining an injury by reason of the negligent operation of any
motor vehicle while being operated by an employee of a governmental entity
while in and about the official business of such governmental entity may recover
in an action against such governmental entity such actual damages as he may
sustain; provided,
S.C. CODE

(c) No person shall recover. . . a sum exceeding ten thousand dollars for
personal injury ....
7. In South Carolina neither the State nor any of its political subdivisions is liable
in an action ex delicto unless expressly authorized by statute, except where the acts
complained of constitute a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Graham v. Charleston Cty. School Bd., 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d 384 (1974);
Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
8. See, e.g., Vernon v. Harleyville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 157, 135 S.E.2d 841,
844 (1964) ("Where the terms of statutes are positive and unambiguous, exceptions not
made by the Legislature cannot be read into the Act by implication. . . .Where there is
an express exception in a statute, all other exceptions which are not expressly set forth
are excluded."); Davis v. City of Greenville, 168 S.C. 476, 480, 167 S.E. 682, 683 (1933)
([Tihe Court is not permitted to give the statute a liberal construction, because the Act
is in derogation of the sovereignty of the State and must be strictly construed ....")
9. IFlor the full and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things are
to be discerned and considered. 1st. What was the common law before the
making of the act? 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide? 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? And, 4th. The true reason of
the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief. . . and
to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act ....
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statute was to provide private citizens with a remedy for the
actual damages caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles by government employees. The majority then evaluated the
Department's contention in light of this legislative intent and
determined that a strict interpretation of the phrase "while being
operated by an employee," such as the interpretation proposed by
the Department, would defeat the intent of the statute. Examining the facts the majority noted "that the stopping or parking of
the motor vehicle was part and parcel of the operation
thereof. . .1.0
In reaching this conclusion the majority relied, in part, upon
1 a 1961 case involving a similar situation. The
Deese v. Williams,"
cause of action in Deese was based on section 33-229 of the Code, 2
which was the statute establishing the liability of the Department
prior to the adoption of the Tort Claims Act in 1968.'1 Section 33229 allowed the Department to be sued by "[any person who
may suffer injury to his person or damage to his property by
reason of . . . the negligent operation of any vehicle or motor
vehicle . . . being operated on official business of the Department ...
."" A dispute arose as to whether or not the Department's vehicle was actually in motion or was completely stopped
when the collision occurred. In reaching its decision the supreme
court assumed the truck was not in motion but predicated the
Department's liability on the Department's failure to meet its
duty to provide adequate warning to oncoming motorists that the
truck was blocking the highway. "[T]he discharge of this duty
Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Q.B. 1584), as quoted in 264 S.C. at 228,
213 S.E.2d at 743.

10. 264 S.C. at 229, 213 S.E.2d at 744.
11. 237 S.C. 560, 118 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-229 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-229 (Cum.

Supp. 1975).
13. No. 1273, [1968] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3027.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-229 (1962). The entire version in effect when Deese was
decided read as follows:
Any person who may suffer injury to his person or damage to his property
by reason of (a) a defect in any State highway, (b) the negligent repair of any
State highway or (c) the negligent operation of any vehicle or motor vehicle in

charge of the State Highway Department while such vehicle or motor vehicle is
actually engaged in the construction or repair of any of such highways or while
otherwise being operated on official business of the Department may bring suit
against the Department for the actual amount of such injury or damage the sum
of three thousand dollars and in case of personal injury or death the sum of eight
thousand dollars.
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was directly connected with the operation of the truck."' 5 To
some extent the supreme court's decision in Deese was based on
two earlier cases - Smoak v. CharlestonCty.'5 and Epps v. South
Carolina State Highway Dep't.17 These two cases clearly established that governmental entities which obstructed a highway
while performing official business had a responsibility to provide
motorists with a reasonable warning of the obstructions in order
to enable them "to avoid injury to themselves and others."'"
In light of Smoak and Epps, a cause of action under the facts
in Truesdale might well have arisen under the existing section
33-229 of the Code'9 which makes the Department liable for "any
defect in the highway."2 Under Smoak a temporary obstruction
in a highway where there is a failure of "such precautions against
collisions

. . .

as prudence and the safety of the traveler would

suggest, "2"subjects the governmental entity 22
creating the obstruchighway.
the
in
defect
a
for
liability
tion to
These cases seem clearly to establish the Department's liability under the facts of Truesdale23 since the Department's truck
was at least partially obstructing the roadway and there was no
sign or flagman to warn oncoming motorists of the danger. While
both Smoak and Epps involved plaintiff-motorists who were injured by collisions precipitated by the negligence of the governmental entity involved, the duty of the governmental entities
toward the motorists, as discerned by the supreme court in those
15. 237 S.C. 560, 566, 118 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1961).
16. 128 S.C. 379, 122 S.E. 862 (1924).
17. 209 S.C. 125, 39 S.E.2d 198 (1946).

18. Id. at 132, 39 S.E.2d at 201.
19. Section 33-229 now reads as follows:
Any person who may suffer injury to his person or damage to his property
by reason of (a) a defect in any State highway or (b) the negligent repair of any
State Highway may bring suit against the Department for the actual amount
of such injury or damage, not to exceed in case of property damage the sum of
three thousand dollars and in case of personal injury or death the sum of eight
thousand dollars. Provided, however, that no person may bring such suits
against the State Highway Department as a consequence or result of any defect
in any highway, or the negligent repair of any highway within the corporate
limits of a municipality which may have resulted from any overt act by a
municipality in the improvement or maintenance by the municipality of such

highway as a city street.
S.C. CODF ANN. § 33-229 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
20. Id.
21. 128 S.C. 379, 383, 122 S.E. 862, 863 (1924).
22. Id.
23. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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cases, may be readily analogized and applied to the facts in
Truesdale. The probable reason for the plaintiff's failing to seek
relief under section 33-229 and relying instead on section 10-2623
is the difference in recovery allowed under each section. Section
33-229 limits recovery for personal injury to $8,000.00,2 while
section 10-2623 allows a maximum recovery for personal injury of
$10,000.00.21
The Department also argued that it should be exempted
from liability by section 46-29021 which provides, in part, that the
provisions of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffics "shall not
apply to. . .motor vehicles. . . while actually engaged in work
upon the surface of a highway. . ...2 Concurring with the logic
of the supreme court of New Mexico which had had occasion to
construe identical statutory language, ' 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the exemption provided by section 46-290
had to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption, that party having to show a clear and unmistakable
right to the benefits of the exemption. 0 The court noted that
stopping the pickup truck so as to partially obstruct the road
"was neither necessary nor incidental to any work upon the surface of the highway and hence not within the intent or purpose
of the exemption provision."3
The final substantial objection 2 raised by the Department
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See note 19 supra.
See note 6 supra.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-290 (1962).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-201 (1962).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-290 (1962) reads as follows:
The provisions of this chapter applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the
highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the
United States, this State or any county, city, town, district or any other political
subdivision of the State, except as provided in this section and subject to such
specific exceptions as are set forth in this chapter with reference to authorized
emergency vehicles. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons,
teams, motor vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon
the surface of a highway, but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when
traveling to or from such work.
29. Sturgeon v. Clark, 69 N. Mex. 132, 364 P.2d 757 (1961).
30. 264 S.C. at 232, 213 S.E.2d at 745.
31. Id. at 233, 213 S.E.2d at 745.
32. The Department also raised two other objections which the supreme court easily
disposed of. First the Department argued that the deceased child was, as a matter of law,
guilty of contributory negligence. The supreme court disagreed finding sufficient evidence
existed on this point to submit it to the jury. Id.
Second the Department contended that the negligence of the motorist was the sole
proximate cause of the fatal accident or that in any event the negligent parking of the
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was that the trial judge erred by not restricting plaintiff's prayer
for relief to the statutory maximum of $10,000 against which
should have been credited the $6,000 received by plaintiff from
the motorist in return for the covenant not to sue. Thus, the
Department argued, its liability should be restricted to a maximum of $4,000. The supreme court disagreed affirming the trial
court's decision to submit plaintiffs full prayer for relief and,
subsequent to the jury's determination of damages, first to credit
the verdict with the $6,000 from the covenant not to sue, thus
reducing the verdict to $29,000, and then further to reduce that
amount to the statutory maximum of $10,000. This still left
$19,000 of the verdict unsatisfied. The supreme court noted in
dictum that the Department "would have been entitled to pro
tanto relief if, but only if, the total damages had been found to
be something less than $16,000."Il
Chief Justice Moss dissented vigorously from the majority
opinion. The substance of his dissent was that a parked vehicle
was not intended to be included under the exemption to sovereign
immunity provided by section 10-2623. Quoting the definition of
operation provided in Corpus Juris Secondum, 34 he concluded
that "operation" did not include parking of the vehicle. As the
only member of the Truesdale court who also had sat on the Deese
court, Chief Justice Moss argued that the majority's reliance on
Deese was misplaced, contending that the truck in Deese was
actually engaged in the repair of the highway. The majority detruck was not the proximate cause. The supreme court noted that one of the cases cited
by the Department correctly set forth the rule of intervening negligence and quoted from
the case:
The test, therefore, by which the negligent conduct of the original wrongdoer is
to be insulated as a matter of law by the independent negligent act of another,
is whether the intervening act and the injury resulting therefrom are of such
character that the author of the primary negligence should have reasonably
foreseen and anticipated them in the light of the attendant circumstances.
Locklear v. Southeastern Stages, 193 S.C. 309, 319, 8 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1940). The supreme
court held that the question of proximate cause was clearly for the jury after applying the
foregoing test to the instant facts. 264 S.C. at 234, 213 S.E.2d at 746; see text accompanying note 5 supra.
33. 264 S.C. at 235, 213 S.E.2d at 747.
34. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 6(2), at 160:
Operation. Ordinarily the word "operation," when used in relation to motor
vehicles, refers to the physical act of working the mechanism of the vehicle; the
actual physical driving and the handling of the motor vehicle; the manipulation
of the controls of a car in order to move it as a vehicle; but it is not limited to
the movement of the car alone, and includes such stops as motor vehicles ordinarily make in the course of their operation.
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cided that the pickup truck in Truesdale was not engaged in any
work upon the surface of the highway. 5 Thus, the Chief Justice
contended, a distinction exists. However, that distinction is a
distinction without a difference because it was unnecessary for
the supreme court to determine whether or not the snow-plow in
Deese was actually engaged in the repair of the highway, since it
was unquestionably engaged in official business when the acci3
dent occurred. 1
The second and more important distinction the Chief Justice
drew between Deese and Truesdale was that the truck in Deese,
even if stopped, was attended and had its mechanism engaged.
In Truesdale, on the other hand, the truck was unattended and
the motor was turned off. These two facts were deemed to exclude
any legitimate finding that the truck was in "operation" under
any normally understood definition of the word. Even so, it is
apparent that the majority of the court had a better grasp of the
intent of the legislature. The passage of the South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act was intended to allow
redress to individuals injured by the negligent operation of official
vehicles on official business. To preclude from the definition of
"operation" under the Act something as incidental to the accomplishment of official business as parking would leave a gaping
hole in the remedial fabric the legislature had intended to weave.
To use a hyperbolized example, the definition championed by
Chief Justice Moss would exempt the Department from liability
for the negligence of an employee who left a truck parked in the
middle of a highway over the top of a rise out of the sight of
oncoming motorists and provided no sign or flagman to warn
those motorists. Even assuming the truck was involved in the
repair of the highway and thus exempt from the provision of the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic and therefore not guilty of negligence per se, the thrust of Deese, Smoak and Epps, nevertheless,
is that the Department will be held liable for negligently failing
to take adequate precautions to prevent those types of accidents
which might be reasonably foreseen. The legislature surely did
not intend to exempt the Department from liability merely because the truck was unattended and the motor was turned off.
Rather their intent was to make the Department liable for its
35. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
36. This was a second, and broader, ground for recovery under Section 33-229. See
note 14 supra.
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actions in performing its official business except in those few
situations where those actions created an unforeseeable danger.
Truesdale advances this intention to make the Department liable
for the foreseeable risk it creates without making it strictly liable
for all the dangers caused by its activities.
In Morris the supreme court faced a second case of first impression involving the South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act. Morris, like Truesdale, was a wrongful death
action brought under section 10-2623. The plaintiff's decedent
was killed in a collision with a South Carolina Highway Patrol
vehicle driven by a highway patrolman. The jury returned a verdict for the respondent for $6,000, and the Department appealed
contending that the patrolman was not on duty at the time of the
accident, that he was in fact on a personal trip in the company
of his wife, and therefore, that he was not engaged in "official
business" within the meaning of section 10-2623. The trial court
found that the patrolman was using the patrol car with the express permission of his superiors in accordance with a general
departmental policy encouraging patrolmen to use official vehicles for private trips during their off-duty hours, thereby increasing the "presence" of Highway Patrol vehicles on the highway.
The trial court overruled motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The supreme court reversed.
Justice Littlejohn, writing for the 3-man majority, held that
section 10-2623 must be strictly construed since it waived the
sovereign immunity of the State. The majority then noted the
apparent realization of the legislature that official vehicles would
be driven other than on official business and their intention that
the waiver of sovereign immunity under section 10-2623 should
not extend to such trips.37 Finally the majority dismissed the
respondent's arguments that the trip constituted official business
because the patrolman retained the right to arrest, because his
very presence had a good influence on other drivers, and because
37. But see text accompanying note 39 infra. One other possible explanation for the
inclusion of the "official business" language in the statute (language Justice Bussey found
superfluous in his dissent, 264 S.C. at 375-76, 215 S.E.2d at 433,) is the desire of the
legislature to make the State liable for acts of its agents over which it had some control
but not to make the State strictly liable for all acts of its agents. "Joy rides" and other
such unauthorized uses of government vehicles would thus be excluded from those acts
for which the State could be held liable. Contrarily, those forays in a motor vehicle done
in furtherance of some governmental business would be included.
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he might be of some service in an accident. The supreme court
felt that these benefits were too remote to justify a finding that
the patrolman was "in and about the official business of. . .[a]
governmental entity."3 8
Justice Bussey, who wrote the majority opinion in Truesdale,
dissented vigorously, as did Justice Ness, who did not sit on the
Truesdale court. Justice Bussey argued that under settled law
"governmental entities have no business except 'official busi-

ness'.

.

.

.,,3"

He then asserted that "[t]he purpose of Section

10-2623 is to put governmental entities, subject to certain statutory limitations, in the same position as such would have occupied if private employers. 4 0 This would make governmental entities liable under the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorfor the negligent acts of its servants to the same, but no greater, extent as
other employers.
Justice Bussey noted that a trial court in deciding whether
or not to grant a motion for a directed verdict must view all the
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. He then reviewed the evidence, noting that the patrolman was in uniform,
driving an official vehicle with the approval and actual encouragement of the Department which paid for all the gasoline and
maintenance for the vehicle. The Department acknowledged that
the patrolman retained his authority to arrest and that his presence on the highway in uniform driving an official vehicle tended
to promote safer driving, one of the objectives of the Department.4
Concluding from this evidence that a jury might reasonably
find that the patrolman was acting within the scope of his duty
and was therefore on or about official business, Justice Bussey
quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
The fact that the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit
himself or a third person does not prevent the act from being
within the scope of employment. If the purpose of serving the
master's business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act is otherwise

within the service ....

42

38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2623. See note 6 supra.
39. 264 S.C. at 375, 215 S.E.2d at 433.
40. Id. at 376, 215 S.E.2d at 433.
41. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-854 (1962). This section imposes on patrolmen the duty
to patrol the highway to enforce the traffic laws.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236, comment b (1957) as quoted in 264 S.C.
at 378, 215 S.E.2d at 434.
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Finally, Justice Bussey found the language used in the case
of League v. National Surety Corp.43 pertinent to the situation in
Morris. League involved the recovery of damages from the bonding agent of an off-duty uniformed patrolman whose actions, precipitated by drinking, caused a serious accident. In that case the
court noted the significance of the officer's being in uniform at the
time of the accident, finding thereby that his actions were colorably in his office and that the bonding agent was therefore required
to respond to the verdict.
Justice Ness also dissented from the majority opinion, but for
somewhat different and more compelling grounds. He disagreed
with Justice Bussey about the pertinency of League, finding that
the appearance of the patrolman was only incidentally related to
the reasons he felt the State should be held liable in Morris. In
analyzing the facts of Morris Justice Ness found that the duty of
the Department was "the utilization of its personnel and equipment as it 'may deem necessarily proper for the enforcement of
the traffic and other related laws."'4" In an effort to accomplish
this objective, the Department had for a long period of time allowed officers to use patrol vehicles during times when they were
not actually on duty.
Citing South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Florence Sporting
Goods, Inc.4" and Whitmire v. Cass,46 Justice Ness noted that the
adoption of a policy by a duly authorized state commission "is
presumed to be in furtherance of the faithful discharge of its
duty." Indeed, the majority noted that the policy of allowing offduty officers the free use of patrol vehicles tended to further the
goals and objectives of the Department. Justice Ness did not view
that benefit as remote but rather saw it as "reasonably calculated
to achieve the end of promotion of vehicular safety,"" and consequently concluded that "as a matter of law, the patrolman was
'inand about the official business' of the Highway Department
or at the very least, the issue was properly submitted to the jury
whose resolution of same against the Department finds abundant
support in the record."4
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 783 (1941).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-851 (1962).
241 S.C. 110, 127 S.E.2d 199 (1962).
213 S.C. 230, 49 S.E.2d 1 (1948).
264 S.C. at 380, 215 S.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 381, 215 S.E.2d at 436.
Id. at 381-82, 215 S.E.2d at 436.
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Justice Ness found the constrictive interpretation of section
10-2623 used by the majority to be an unwarranted frustration of
the legislative intent and cited Truesdale as an indication of the
previous desire of the supreme court not "to yoke the Tort Claims
Act with rigid constructions ill calculated to further the purposes
of the Act . . .-.
It is difficult to reconcile Truesdale with Morris. The former
case appeared to indicate that the supreme court would view the
actions of the Highway Department in light of the apparent legislative intent to allow private individuals redress for damage
caused by the negligence of governmental employees. The latter
case seems to indicate that the court will jealously guard the right
of the State to exempt itself from suit, allowing only those actions
to be brought which are undeniably within the explicit language
of the statutes. Truesdale implies a greater concern with the
rights of an injured plaintiff than with the right of the State to
be free from suit, while the latter case implies the reverse. It is
interesting to note that Justice (now Chief Justice) Lewis was the
only justice to side with the majority in both cases. However, this
is not especially helpful since he did not write either opinion.
One possible explanation of this difference in the supreme
court's approach is a variation of the "but for" test of liability.
But for the Highway Department's performing its official duties
of building and repairing roads, the pickup truck in Truesdale
would never have been where it was at the time of the accident.
Indeed it never would have been set upon the highway at all. On
the other hand, even if the Highway Department had not allowed
the patrolman in Morris to use his patrol car for personal business, the patrolman would probably have taken the trip anyway
using his personal car instead. The Department's sanction of his
use of the patrol car for personal business in no way added to the
jeopardy of the plaintiff. No extra vehicles were sent upon the
road and no special hazards were created as happened in
Truesdale. Departmental actions had little or no effect on the
circumstances leading up to the fatal collision.
Since Morris was decided a month after Truesdale and since
the author of one of the dissents in Morris as well as the majority
opinion in Truesdale has retired from the bench,5 it would probably serve attorneys well when faced with a similar problem in50. Id. at 381, 215 S.E.2d at 436. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
51. Justice Bussey retired in 1975, as did Chief Justice Moss.
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volving sovereign immunity to do everything possible to characterize their facts so that they unquestionably fit under whatever
statutory exemption to sovereign immunity is provided. Failing
that, attorneys should perhaps attempt to characterize the facts
in terms of the "but for" test mentioned above.
IX.

SUDDEN EMERGENCY

In another 3-2 decision, the supreme court held that a trial
court's charge on sudden emergency in a case involving a wrongful death action on behalf of an 8-year-old boy who collided with
the defendant's car, the defendant not having seen the child, was
at most harmless error. Justice Littlejohn, writing the opinion in
Wiggins v. Thomas,5" noted the following pertinent facts. The
defendant, who was driving on a four-lane highway in the outside
lane, asserted that there was a car in the adjacent lane a little
ahead of her which obscured her vision of the concrete median
dividing the highway. The deceased child had been standing on
the median attempting to cross the highway together with several
other children. Suddenly he darted into the highway colliding
with the defendant's car. The defendant did not see the child
until the moment of impact. The trial judge charged the jury on
the law of negligence, recklessness, willfullness and wantonness,
contributory negligence, and, despite the repeated protests of
plaintiff's counsel, sudden emergency. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
Justice Littlejohn noted that sudden emergency is "not a
defense in and of itself,"5 but rather it is "merely a portion of the
overall charge of the law of negligence. . . ."" The supreme court
then held that the plaintiff had failed to carry the burden of
showing that the charge could have prejudiced his case.
Justice Bussey, dissenting in an opinion which was concurred
in by Justice (now Chief Justice) Lewis, felt that the charge on
sudden emergency was both erroneous and prejudicial and contended that a new trial should be granted. Justice Bussey elaborated on the facts as presented in the majority opinion, revealing
several important discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses.
The most important discrepancy was the conflict in testimony
concerning the existence or nonexistence of the car in the adjoin52. 264 S.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 426 (1975).
53. Id, at 365, 215 S.E.2d at 428.
54. Id.
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ing lane which the defendant claimed obstructed her view of the
children standing on the median. Justice Bussey noted that only
the defendant and her husband testified that the car was in the
adjoining lane a little ahead of their car. The other witnesses
apparently testified that there was no such car and the defendant's view was unobstructed. Additionally the defendant had
been licensed to drive for only 10 days; her husband, whom she
was driving to work, was already 20 minutes late; and the defendant was familiar with the area and knew children freqpently
crossed the road at the point where the collision took place. Finally, it was testified that one of the other children had crossed
safely in front of the defendant without being seen by her. 55
Justice Bussey noted that in order for the sudden emergency
doctrine to have any application to a situation, the actor must
realize that he is faced with an emergency and must make an
immediate decision to try to avoid or minimize the danger.5
Since the testimony of the defendant was to the effect that she
did not see the child until just prior to, or right at, impact, there
was no time for her to even recognize the danger, much less make
even the hastiest decision about how to avoid it.
Since the evidence strongly suggested liability on the defendant's part, the dissent felt there was a "reasonable probability"'
that the jury might have been confused by the instruction" and
thus thought the case should be remanded for a new trial.
lI.

PRODUCTS LIABLITY - BREACH OF WARRANTY

In ImperialDie Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co.59 the su55. Id. at 366-67, 215 S.E.2d at 429.
56. Id. at 368, 215 S.E.2d at 429; see McVey v. Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d

92 (1966); Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964); Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433,
13 S.E.2d 486 (1941); W. PRossER,

LAw OF

ToRTs § 33 (4th ed. 1971); Wise, The Sudden

Emergency Doctrine as Applied in South Carolina,20 S.C.L. REv. 408 (1968).
57. The reasonable probability test as to the effect of extraneous matter prejudicially

influencing the jury has been stated in two different ways in South Carolina. In Entzminger v. Seigler, 186 S.C. 194, 200, 195 S.E. 244, 246 (1938), the supreme court spoke in terms
of there being "a reasonable probability that the jury was influenced." On the other hand,
the court in Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 160, 156 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1967), used the
converse of the test expressed in Entzminger noting that "[wie cannot say with any
reasonable certainty that the erroneous admission of this evidence did not, in fact, prejudice plaintiff's case."
58. The dissent noted that the instruction on sudden emergency came near the end
of the charge and was explained at some length by the trial judge and that any confusion
created by the charge would thus have been magnified. 264 S.C. at 369, 215 S.E.2d at 430.
59. 264 S.C. 604, 216 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
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preme court considered for the first time whether contributory
negligence is a defense to an action brought on breach of warranty. 0 The action was brought by the plaintiffs to recover damages suffered when a ventilation system installed by the defendant malfunctioned, causing a fire. The fire had spread rapidly
after igniting the insulation installed by a co-defendant, who allegedly had warranted that the insulation was non-flammable.
Both the building and its contents were destroyed. The trial court
granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' second
answer to the breach of warranty count alleging contributory negligence and the defendant" appealed."
In a unanimous decision the supreme court held that contributory negligence was not a defense to a breach of warranty action. In adopting what it perceived as the majority view, 3 the
4
court relied heavily on the reasoning of Brown v. Chapman."
Brown quoted from Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.:65
Negligence on the part of the buyer would not operate as a
defense to a breach of warranty. If the manufacturer chooses to
extend the scope of his liability by certifying certain qualities
as existent, the negligent acts of the buyer, bringing about the
60. The plaintiffs (owners and lessors of a building) alleged in their complaint the
breach of an express or implied warranty that the ventilating systems installed by the
defendant Piper would safely evacuate heat and fumes from the plaintiff's building and
further that they would constitute no fire hazard to the building. Plaintiffs also alleged
as a cause of action negligence on the defendants' part.
61. Covil and a co-defendant, North Carolina Foam Insulation, which supplied the
raw insulation material used in the building, settled with the plaintiff. Only J.A. Piper
Roofing Co. (Piper), which installed the faulty ventilation system, remained as a defendant.
62. Piper appealed also on the ground that the complaint alleged two causes of action
(negligence and breach of warranty) and that the trial court erred in not granting the
defendant's motion to require the plaintiffs to make an election as to which theory they
would proceed under. Citing Glenn v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 250 S.C. 323, 157
S.E.2d 630 (1967) as controlling, the supreme court held that no election was required.
The court concluded that there was but one primary wrong and the plaintiffs sought only
one recovery. Because genuine issues of fact remained after extensive discovery and because the two different theories required the proof of somewhat different elements, the
supreme court reasoned that the plaintiffs should not be put to an election which might
jeopardize their recovery.
63. It is somewhat unclear just which is the majority view. Of the cases cited in 2 L.
FRUMER & M. FRiEDMAN, PaODucTs LIABlLrrY § 16.01[3] (1976 & Supp. May 1976), only
13 jurisdictions are cited as allowing contributory negligence as a defense. The instant case
is not yet listed.
64. 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
65. 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
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revelation that the qualities do not exist, would not defeat recovery. .. 66
The court, prompted by the defendant-appellant's concern
that the trial court on remand might misinterpret the opinion,
was careful to distinguish between contributory negligence, which
is not a defense, and the misuse and/or abuse of a product, which
goes directly to the matter of proximate cause. The supreme
court noted that "[u]nder a general denial a defendant may
always introduce any evidence which tends to disprove that
which the plaintiff must prove as a basis for recovery."6 8 Therefore, the court concluded, the defendant "should be allowed to
introduce any evidence that the misuse or abuse of the product
was the proximate cause of the damages."69
In drawing the distinction between contributory negligence
and misuse or abuse, the supreme court joined the reasoning of
two leading commentators in the area of products liability." In
addition, the Imperial Die decision does not preclude the use by
defendant of the defense of assumption of risk. Another leading
authority has explained the seeming disagreement over whether
or not contributory negligence is a defense to a breach of warranty
action in terms of the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk.7" Virtually
all the cases which have held that contributory negligence is a
defense to breach of warranty have involved situations where the
plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known unreasonable danger,72
which situations tend to closely resemble assumption of risk. On
the other hand, most of the cases which have held that contributory negligence was not a defense to breach of warranty action
have involved situations where the plaintiff failed to discover the
danger in the product or to take precautions against the possibility of its existence. 3 Thus attorneys desiring to assert the plain66. Id. at 258, as quoted in Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co., 264 S.C.

604, 609, 216 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1975).
67. 264 S.C. at 610, 216 S.E.2d at 534.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See 2 L. FRumvR & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABIuTY § 16.01131 (1976).
71. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 102 (4th ed. 1971).
72. See, e.g., Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d

744 (1970) (evidence of use of T.V. set after sparks and smoke were observed emitting from
set); Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use
of bags knowing there were holes in them); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, 235 Mo. App.
699, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1940) (continued use of refrigerated display case after discovering it
was unfit).
73. See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (extraordinarily
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tiff's negligence as a defense should seek to characterize that
negligence as either misuse or abuse of the product going to the
matter of proximate cause or else they should try to characterize
the negligence as a voluntary encounter with a danger known to
be unreasonable, thus being more closely akin to assumption of
74
risk than traditional contributory negligence.
IV.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Continuing its animosity to the doctrine, the supreme court
again rejected res ipsa loquitur as a basis for tort liability in
Legette v. Smith,75 adhering to its previous decisions 7 on the
matter. This wrongful death action was brought by the parents
of a three-year-old boy against the contractor who constructed a
septic tank two and one-half years prior to the fatal accident. The
boy drowned after the lid of the tank collapsed. No one saw the
accident occur. The plaintiff presented no evidence as to the
cause of the lid's collapsing nor as to any negligence on the contractor's part in installing it, except to testify that no vehicles had
driven over it since it had been installed. After all the testimony
was presented, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant.
Plaintiff appealed, alleging error on the part of the trial court (1)
in ruling that the evidence did not support one or more of the
allegations of negligence, and (2) in failing to apply the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. The supreme court rejected these contentions
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.7
flammable dress negligently ignited by cigarette ash); Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212
Cal. App.2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963) (exploding bottle case); Richard v. H.P. Hood &
Sons, 104 R.I. 267, 243 A.2d 910 (1968) (failure to discover shard of glass in paper cap).
But see Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967)

(any implied warranty of workmanlike service would give rise to same standard of care
required in negligence action and therefore defense of contributory negligence would be
applicable).
74. However, such characterization seems unnecessary for cases arising under the
Uniform Sales Act. These cases have consistently denied recovery to the buyer who failed
to adequately inspect the merchandise, when such inspection would have revealed the
defect. See, e.g., Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1928); Salzman v. Maldaver, 315 Mich. 403, 24 N.W.2d 161 (1946); Richards v.
Watertite Co., 169 Neb. 263, 99 N.W.2d 265 (1959).
75. 265 S.C. 573, 220 S.E.2d 429 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 233 S.C. 536, 106
S.E.2d 381 (1958); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
841 (1950); Heath v. Town of Darlington, 175 S.C. 27, 177 S.E. 894 (1934); Bridge v.
Orange Crush Bottlers, 164 S.C. 351, 162 S.E. 325 (1931).
77. 265 S.C. at 575-77, 220 S.E.2d at 429-30.
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B.

Relieving Contractorof Liability

A contractor may not be relieved of liability by acceptance
of the project by some party other than the contracting party. In
Smith v. Fitton and Pittman, Inc.,78 the supreme court distinguished Clyde v. Sumere79 which had held that a "contractor is
not liable to a third person receiving injury or damage as a result
of the negligent construction of the work, after the completion
and acceptance thereof by the contractee or owner.""0 In Smith,
however, the defendant's work had not been accepted by the
contracting party, a telephone company, but rather it had been
"accepted" by an agent of the land owner on whose property the
replaced telephone pole was located. Defendant was unable to
show that the agent, a mechanic, had actual or apparent authority, or the inherent agency power to accept work for the replacement of a telephone pole and thus authorize the workmen to leave
the old hole unfilled. Even if the mechanic had had such authority from the land owner, the court noted that would not have
relieved the liability of the defendant since, as an independent
contractor, it "was charged with a duty of due care to leave the
premises in a safe condition, that is, free from any hazards which
[it] may have created, ' 81 and, even under Clyde, that liability
could be relieved only by the contracting party.
C.

Malicious Prosecution

Dismissal of a criminal charge does not constitute sufficient
evidence, in and of itself, to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution. To sustain such a cause of action, there must
be shown to have been an absence of probable cause as to the
original charge. 2 In Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 3 the South Caro78. 264 S.C. 129, 212 S.E.2d 925 (1975).
79. 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d 392 (1958).
80. Id. at 232-33, 104 S.E.2d at 393. To some extent this rule has been modified by
Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968), which held a contractor-vendor
liable for injuries caused by negligent construction and failure to warn the vendee of an
unreasonably dangerous condition.
81. 264 S.C. at 133, 212 S.E.2d at 926.
82. To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must show
(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil
or criminal; (2) by, or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such
proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5)
want of probable cause, and (6) resulting injury or damage.
Parrot v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965).
83. 265 S.C. 563, 220 S.E.2d 649 (1975).
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lina Supreme Court held, in effect, that a layman could not be
held liable for malicious prosecution merely because he instituted
legal proceedings against a person, part of which were later dismissed by the magistrate. The defendant caused a warrant to be
issued by the magistrate charging the plaintiff with disorderly
conduct and simple assault."4 The plaintiff was convicted of simple assault but the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed
which dismissal constituted the gravamen of the malicious prosecution action against the defendant.
While noting that disorderly conduct and simple assault
were "independent charges with separate elements,", the court
went on to say that "they are sufficiently similar to a layman that
an action for malicious prosecution should not be available,
where, as here, both charges arise out of the same set of circumstances." 6 The court also noted that malicious prosecution was
a cause of action "for the innocent victim who has been haled into
court on baseless charges"87 and found that the plaintiff, having
been convicted of simple assault, was not an innocent victim but
rather was guilty of a criminal offense.
Concurring with the plaintiff that malice may be implied
from a want of probable cause, s' the supreme court nevertheless
disagreed that dismissal of the disorderly conduct charge constituted an absence of probable cause. Reviewing a definition of
probable cause,89 the court found -the defendant had probable
cause to have instigated the actions against the plaintiff. The
court then threw in a gratuitous statement which might lead to
some confusion regarding the effect of the decision: "It affirmatively appearing that the [plaintiff] was guilty of the criminal
offense of simple assault, he cannot successfully maintain this
action for malicious prosecution.""0 While the statement is
84. The manager of defendant's store confronted plaintiff and three companions,
suspecting them of shoplifting. The plaintiff assaulted the manager who then followed
plaintiff out of,the store and accused him of shoplifting. The manager exchanged words
with the plaintiff and attempted unsuccessfully to make a citizen's arrest.
85. Id. at 566, 220 S.E.2d at 651; see State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 175 S.E.2d 227 (1970).
86. 265 S.C. at 567, 220 S.E.2d at 651.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 568, 220 S.E.2d at 651; see Margolis v. Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 122 S.E.2d
417 (1961).
89. "[Tihe existence of such facts or circumstances as would excite the belief of a
reasonable mind, acting on facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1365 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), as quoted in 265 S.C. at 563, 220 S.E. at 652.
90. 265 S.C. at 568, 220 S.E.2d at 652.
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unquestionably correct, it could conceivably be read, together
with the discussion of probable cause, to imply that the defendant would not have had probable cause if the plaintiff had not
been convicted of one of the crimes he was charged with. This is
certainly not what the court intended, but the above sentence
throws the matter in some doubt.9"
D.

Last Clear Chance

In an unpublished9 2 order denying respondent's petition for
a rehearing,93 Chief Justice Moss and Justice Littlejohn joined
with Justice Brailsford in holding the last clear chance doctrine
inapplicable to the facts presented in Oliver v. Brazell.94 In so
doing the court continued its previous, though unasserted, policy
of distinguishing between the "helpless" plaintiff and the
"inattentive" plaintiff in deciding the applicability of the last
clear chance doctrine to a particular set of facts. 5
William L. Todd
91. An excellent explanation of the probable cause a prosecutor must have had in
order to defeat subsequent action for malicious prosecution is found in Cook v. Lanier,
267 N.C. 166, 170, 147 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1966):
Probable cause for a criminal prosecution does not depend upon the guilt
or innocence of the accused of the crime charged, nor upon the fact as to whether
a crime has actually been committed, but depends on the prosecutor's honest
belief in such guilt based on reasonable grounds. It is a case of apparent, rather
than actual, guilt.
92. The author is indebted to Isadore A. Bernstein, Esq., attorney for the plaintiffrespondent, for bringing this unpublished order to his attention.
93. Oliver v. Brazell, No. 19926 (S.C., filed Apr. 7, 1975). The petition for rehearing
was based on S.C. Const. art. 5, § 2 which requires "[i]n all cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the concurrence of three of the justices shall be necessary for a reversal of the
judgment below." Since two justices voted to reverse and enter judgment for the defendant, and the other justice who voted to reverse did so because he felt that the trial court's
instruction on last clear chance was both erroneous and prejudicial, the three justices who
had voted to reverse had not concurred on the reason why reversal was proper.
94. 264 S.C. 53, 212 S.E.2d 922 (1974).
95. For an excellent discussion of last clear chance and Oliver v. Brazell, see Torts,
1974 Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 27 S.C.L. Rxv. 554, 562-73 (1975).
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